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Burke on Law, Revolution and Constitution 
martin loughlin
Introduction
Edmund Burke occupies an ambiguous po-
sition in legal, political and constitutional 
thought. A lawyer by training, he gained 
his reputation primarily as a man of letters 
and skilled parliamentarian. Possessed of 
great intellectual and literary talents, many 
have nonetheless questioned whether he 
was able to elaborate a coherent political 
philosophy. One difficulty is that although 
Burke excelled at the essay form, these vary 
considerably in tone and mood, revealing 
ambiguities about his political convictions, 
his philosophical beliefs and his jurispru-
dential thought. Depending on context, 
Burke is capable of appearing in the guise 
of conservative, liberal, and radical. Is he, 
we might ask, a realist, a historicist and a 
consequentialist thinker? Or is he an ide-
alist or even a Romantic? The sheer range 
and variety of his political writings might 
cause us to conclude that his genius is 
founded not on his political philosophy but 
of his singular grasp of the character of the 
practical engagement of politics.
In this paper, I outline the main themes 
of his political writing. These themes are 
distilled from the position Burke takes on 
the four great issues that most occupied his 
attention: the revolutions in North Ameri-
ca and France and the status of, and treat-
ment within the British Empire, of Ireland 
and India. A question immediately pre-
sents itself. Does he maintain a consistent 
position over these controversies? He sup-
ports the claims of the American colonists 
for independence, advocates an extension 
of English legal and political privileges to 
the Irish, and opposes the harsh govern-
mental regime instituted by the East India 
Company in India. His arguments on these 
issues are decidedly liberal. And yet, when 
it comes to the revolutionary overthrow of 
the Ancien Régime in France, his denuncia-
tion is vehement. The work for which he is 
most famous, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, acquires a classic status in modern 
political thought as the epitome of conserv-
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ative thought. Can his positions on these is-
sues be reconciled? 
Burke himself thought so, though not all 
commentators are convinced. He evidently 
changed his view on particular questions, as 
is illustrated with respect to his treatment 
of the Glorious Revolution. In Thoughts on 
the Cause of the Present Discontents, written 
in 1770, he recognized that that Revolution 
had brought about certain fundamental 
changes to the English system of govern-
ment; he accepted, for example, that the 
Revolution had deprived the Crown and the 
government of many useful prerogatives1. 
But in a late work, An Appeal from the New 
to the Old Whigs (1791), he denies this to be 
the case. Instead, we find him maintaining 
that the Revolution was justified only on the 
basis that «the people, who have inherited 
its freedom … are bound in duty to trans-
mit the same constitution to their posteri-
ty»2. Such discrepancies might cause us to 
think that perhaps there are, in reality, two 
Burkes: the liberal youth and the conserva-
tive man. I suggest, however, that although 
his essays present differences of emphasis, 
there is a consistency of thought.
This consistency has been clouded by 
the subsequent reception and reworking of 
his ideas. Burke is best known to us today 
as a conservative who stoutly defended the 
virtues of traditional hierarchical ordering. 
This was not the case during the 19th cen-
tury. Then, especially under the influence 
of his biographer, John Morley, he was re-
fashioned as a liberal and a positivist whose 
thought helped shape the ideas of John Stu-
art Mill and his disciples3. To get to the core 
of Burke’s distinctive contribution, these 
layers of accretion must be stripped away 
and his work examined in the context of his 
times.
My objective in this short paper, then, 
is to sketch the main themes that emerge 
in Burke’s works. I take these to be those of 
law, revolution and constitution. In com-
mon with many thinkers of his time, Burke 
was strongly influenced by Montesquieu, 
with whom he shared a belief that the com-
plex relationship between law and society 
is formed by the cultural and historical life 
of a nation. His ideas were also shaped by 
the works of Bacon, Locke and Hume, from 
whom he acquired a belief in the impor-
tance of the experience. But alongside the 
practical, evolutionary mode of thought 
Burke retained a Christian belief in the 
workings of natural law. Burke therefore 
blends historical sensibility and moral 
principle in a manner opposed to the Car-
tesians of his day4, projecting a compel-
ling account of the proper relation between 
thought and action, theory and practice. 
These underlying influences have a defin-
ing impact on his views on law, revolution 
and constitution.
1. Constitution
We should first consider Burke’s arguments 
on how governments acquire authority. 
His basic stance is that government is to be 
evaluated according to the degree to which it 
is able properly to attend to the needs of its 
people. Authority flows not from the man-
ner of its constitution, but from the ends it 
is able to realize. All governmental power is 
acquired by artifice. Since it is a derogation 
from the principle of the natural equality of 
mankind, it can be justified only by demon-
strating how it works to the benefit of its 
people5. This is Burke’s cardinal rule. It is 
Loughlin
51
clearly outlined in An Appeal from the New to 
the Old Whigs, where he states that:
The practical consequences of any political tenet 
go a great way in deciding upon its value. Polit-
ical problems do not primarily concern truth or 
falsehood. They relate to good or evil. What in 
the result is likely to produce evil, is politically 
false: that which is productive of good, politically 
is true6.
This provides the bedrock of princi-
ple running through all Burke’s works. On 
this foundation he argues for reforms to 
the government of Ireland, defends the 
claims of the American colonists, criticizes 
the East India Company’s regime in India, 
and vehemently opposes the revolution in 
France. «I cannot think that what is done in 
France», he declares in 1792, «is beneficial 
to the human race». But if that did prove to 
be the case, then neither the British consti-
tution nor any other should prevail against 
it7. 
This suggests that Burke’s views about 
constitutional ordering are not as conserv-
ative as some have imagined. He does not 
believe, as some imply, that the authority 
of a constitution rests on its ancient line-
age. Rather, his argument is that the pre-
scriptive constitution proves its worth not 
by virtue of its longevity but from the good 
outcomes it produces. The existence of a 
long-established constitution does not 
therefore render irrelevant any discussion 
of a government’s legitimacy. His point is 
that it eliminates allegations that govern-
ment is illegitimate simply because it has 
not been authorized by its present gener-
ation of subjects. Burke’s argument about 
the prescription of the constitution is di-
rected in particular against radical natural 
rights claims, specifically, the claim that 
each generation has the right to determine 
its own arrangements of government. Any 
claim based on natural rights is abandoned 
at the moment humans enter into civil so-
ciety and form governing arrangements. 
Thereafter, the justification of government 
rests only on the benefits it bestows.
The existence of a long-standing consti-
tution does not therefore end all discussion 
of its rightness or authority. Such a consti-
tution has proven its value over many gen-
erations and, given the fickleness of human 
reason, the fact that this arrangement is the 
consequence of the work of «many minds, 
in many ages» makes it intrinsically wor-
thy of respect8. Of the British constitution, 
which is taken as the epitome of a prescrip-
tive constitution, he states:
It is no simple, no superficial thing, nor to be es-
timated by superficial understandings. An igno-
rant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with 
his clock, is however sufficiently confident to 
think he can safely take to pieces, and put togeth-
er at his pleasure, a moral machine of another 
guise, importance and complexity, composed of 
far other wheels, and springs, and balances, and 
counteracting and co-operating powers. Men lit-
tle think how immorally they act in rashly med-
dling with what they do not understand9.
The criterion of a good constitution, 
then, is the goodness of the results it pro-
duces. But Burke is also saying that ‘good 
results’ in the treacherous field of the po-
litical are not easily calibrated and it is for 
this reason that the inherited arrangements 
of government should not lightly be tam-
pered with. This does not require blind 
adherence to the existing constitution, al-
though it would appear to rule out radical 
change. Sensitive incremental reform of 
the constitution is fine: we should get rid of 
the accretions that no longer deliver good 
government. But we must never lose sight 
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of the fundamentals: we must always work 
with the grain.
Consequently, the principle of pre-
scription in government – of adherence to 
the inherited constitution – does not en-
tail stasis. «A state without the means of 
some change», he maintains, «is without 
the means of its conservation»10. But does 
this suggest that the type of revolutionary 
change embodied by the French Revolution 
on the foundation on natural rights claims 
should be opposed? Burke answers in the 
affirmative, reasoning that a constitution 
is not created by a political pact through 
which a people, at a particular moment in 
time, agree the fundamental principles of 
its government. The constitution is a pact 
that subsists through time: the constitution 
«is a partnership not only between those 
who are living, but between those who are 
living, those who are dead, and those who 
are to be born»11. Constitutions undoubt-
edly change through time, but these chang-
es must be gradual, evolutionary, and they 
must remain fixed on the objective of pro-
moting the public good.
2. Rights, Reform and Revolution
That Burke’s view on the authority of the 
constitution provides the basis for under-
standing many of the contentious political 
issues of his times is most clearly illustrated 
with respect to his position on Ireland and 
America.
He consistently promoted the cause of 
reform in Ireland. Seventeenth century 
upheavals in Ireland had entrenched Prot-
estant rule in an overwhelmingly Catholic 
country. Burke argued that no one could 
contend that the existing regime – in which 
Catholics were barred from participation 
in political affairs and Irish Protestant rule 
was sustained by bargaining with the Eng-
lish government – was in the best interests 
of the Irish people. Reform was required not 
because of a Romantic notion of self-gov-
ernment, but because England needed the 
support of the Irish to ensure their own se-
curity. Basic political reforms – including 
that of Catholic emancipation – were need-
ed to ensure that Ireland remained within 
the British Empire12. His position on Irish 
affairs conformed to his general political 
philosophy. In Thoughts on the Cause of the 
Present Discontents (1770), he noted that 
«the people have no interest in disorder» 
and that «where popular discontents have 
been very prevalent, it may well be affirmed 
and supported that there has been generally 
something found amiss in the constitution, 
or in the conduct of government»13.
Burke’s views with respect to the dis-
putes that arose in the American colonies 
are similarly consistent with his general 
political convictions. He had initially been 
in favour of the Declaratory Act, which de-
clared the right of Parliament to tax the 
colonies – indeed, he may even have been 
responsible for its drafting14. But he soon 
came to recognize that taxation of the col-
onists was not prudent politics. A nation 
is not governed, he explained, «which is 
perpetually to be conquered»15. He there-
fore argued that the situation demanded re-
straint on the part of the British Parliament. 
The question is «not whether you have a 
right to render your people miserable, but 
whether it is not in your interest to make 
them happy». Expanding the point, he adds 
that it «is not what a lawyer tells me I may 
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do, but what humanity, reason, and justice 
tell me I ought to do»16. 
For Burke, such questions could not be 
resolved purely by legal formalities of right 
and duty; they were determined accord-
ing to the political logic of prudence and 
the maintenance of peace. Once it is es-
tablished that prudence dictates restraint, 
however, he is not slow to convert the mat-
ter into an issue of principle. The liber-
ty-loving settler colonists who carried their 
common law rights with them were not pre-
pared to submit to taxation by an institution 
in which they had no representation. So far 
as Burke is concerned, the Americans were 
justified in claiming that by being sub-
jected to taxation without representation 
they were reduced to the status of slavery 
(though the ironic dimension of the claim 
being made by the colonists seems to have 
escaped them). 
This right of rebellion, Burke implies, is 
established only when prudential require-
ments can be converted into a general po-
litical principle. The starting point is the 
right to liberty enshrined in the common 
law and from which the constitutional laws 
of England derive. These rights are not 
bequeathed by statute law; rather they are 
rights on which the foundation of govern-
mental authority rests. Only if governments 
ignore these conditions and subvert basic 
liberties without any evident utility, might 
the people be justified in rebelling. Burke’s 
argument has the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty – and especially a parliament 
stuffed with the King’s placemen – directly 
in his sights. Yet we must also acknowledge 
that his argument comes close to upholding 
those natural rights that elsewhere he de-
cries as abstract metaphysical nonsense.
This stance on the American conflict 
poses a more general question: in what cir-
cumstances might the overthrow of the es-
tablished government be justified? When 
might the abuse of governmental authority 
lead to the establishment of a right of rebel-
lion? The explanation he provides is based 
on the doctrine of necessity. The clearest 
evidence that he accepts such a doctrine of 
necessity – that of reason of state – can be 
found in his account of the Revolution of 
168817. Burke believes that necessity could 
be invoked only in the most extreme case, 
when action is clearly needed and would 
redound to the benefit to the entire socie-
ty. On these grounds, he maintains that the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 was entirely 
justifiable. 
Burke therefore accepts the revolution-
ary character of the events of 1688 but argues 
that the overthrow of James II amounted 
only to «a small and a temporary deviation 
from the strict order of a regular hereditary 
succession»18. He accepts that the adop-
tion of William of Orange as king «was not 
properly a choice» but «was an act of neces-
sity, in the strictest moral sense in which 
necessity can be taken»19. The crown was 
therefore «carried somewhat out of the line 
in which it had before moved; but the new 
line was derived from the same stock» and 
«it was still a line of hereditary descent»20. 
Consequently, the «principles of the Revo-
lution did not authorize them to elect kings 
at their pleasure, and without attention to 
the antient fundamental principles of our 
government»21. And neither was the over-
throw the result of mere misconduct. «No 
government could stand a moment», he 
claims, «if it could be blown down with any 
thing so loose and indefinite as an opinion 
of misconduct»22. On the contrary, only a 
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«grave and overruling necessity obliged 
them to take the step they took»23. 
For Burke, such a revolutionary act will 
always amount to «an extraordinary ques-
tion of state» and be «wholly out of the 
law». It is «a case of war and not of consti-
tution». And it is therefore a question «of 
dispositions, and of means, and of proba-
ble consequences, rather than of positive 
rights». But he was keen to emphasize 
that this type of remedy «was not made for 
common abuses» and it therefore «is not 
to be agitated by common minds»24. Gov-
ernments «must be abused and deranged» 
before revolution can be contemplated: «a 
revolution will be the very last resource of 
the thinking and the good»25. Burke was 
here at pains to emphasize the point that 
revolutionary action is not generated from 
general theories of government and consti-
tution, nor from abstract concepts of right. 
The legitimacy of such action must be as-
sessed by reference to the specific political 
circumstances. And the relevant criteria are 
whether it is driven by necessity and under-
taken with a minimal degree of disruption 
to the established order.
3. The Revolution in France
Can Burke’s account of revolutionary ac-
tion driven by necessity be reconciled 
with his infamous views about the nature 
and significance of the French revolution? 
His tone in Reflections undoubtedly differs 
from that of earlier works. With respect to 
earlier political conflicts, he had expressed 
understanding for popular insurrection on 
the grounds that the people are not easily 
roused but that when motivated into ac-
tion they are invariably right26. The tone in 
Reflections is decidedly different. Here he 
places the initial blame for the revolution 
on the king’s advisers, but thereafter on the 
cabal that expresses its revolutionary spirit. 
Most striking is his characterization of the 
role of ‘the people’, which deviates consid-
erably from earlier formulations.
Burke first rails against the perfidy of 
the king’s advisers who informed him that 
by convening the Estates General «he had 
nothing to fear but the prodigal excess of 
their zeal in providing for the support of 
the throne»27. These counsellors are held 
responsible for having seen «the medicine 
of the state corrupted into its poison»28. 
Through their ineptitude in promoting the 
«perilous adventures of untried policy» 
the French people have been motivated to 
«rebel against a mild and lawful monarch, 
with more fury, outrage, and insult than 
ever any people has been known to rise 
against the most illegal usurper, or the most 
sanguinary tyrant»29.
His immediate target with respect to 
failures of statecraft may be right: it was in-
deed a failure of «rash and ignorant coun-
sel»30. But one cannot help but feel that his 
views on the people are exaggerated. Was 
this really a mob of unprecedented fury 
and outrage? We must bear in mind the fact 
that his essay was written in 1790, a period 
still in the early stages of revolution dur-
ing which the French king remained un-
touched. And we should note the fact that 
although spending a significant portion 
of the Reflections explaining and justifying 
the achievements of the Glorious Revolu-
tion, he entirely overlooks the precedent of 
the English civil war of the 1640s, a bloody 
conflict that led to the execution of a king. 
Ignoring that precedent, he complains 
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only of the great destruction effected by the 
French mob and of learning «cast into the 
mire and trodden down under the hoofs of a 
swinish multitude»31.
But Burke’s most vehement outrage is 
reserved for those who have misguided the 
people: the «literary cabal» that forged a 
plan «for the destruction of the Christian 
religion»32, otherwise referred to as «a 
cabal calling itself philosophic» which has 
generated the «true actuating spirit» of the 
people’s actions33. These are, at best, «only 
men of theory», who lack «any practical 
experience in the state»34. A great pro-
portion of the National Assembly may have 
been lawyers, but they were not juriscon-
sults experienced in affairs of state. Rather, 
they were only «the inferior, unlearned, 
mechanical, merely instrumental members 
of the profession»35. These «could not be 
expected to bear with moderation … a pow-
er which they themselves, more than any 
others, must be surprised to find in their 
hands»36. These were «men formed to be 
instruments, not controls»37. Once they 
had acquired the reins of power, their natu-
ral tendency was towards centralization and 
standardization, with the result that «every 
landmark of the country» was abolished 
«in favour of a geometrical and arithmeti-
cal constitution»38. The power of the city of 
Paris became «one great spring of all their 
politics»; it became «the centre and focus 
of jobbing», through which «the leaders of 
this faction direct, or rather command, the 
whole legislative and the whole executive 
government»39.
Burke maintains that this group – «the 
politicians of metaphysics» – had «opened 
schools for sophistry and made establish-
ments for anarchy»40. The French nation 
had thereby been delivered over to anarchy 
and the tyranny of the multitude. His pre-
diction that such a destruction of consti-
tutional order could lead only to the estab-
lishment of a ruthless dictatorship has been 
widely admired. Whether it is attributable 
to Burke’s practical insight and wisdom in 
the arts of government or to his thoroughly 
jaundiced view of the revolution remains an 
open question.
4. Revolutions Contrasted
The French Revolution, Burke contends, 
arose from a combination of forces: the 
weakness of the forces of conservation and 
the strength of those of revolution. But if it 
was due to the ineptitude of counsellors to-
gether with a conspiracy of the professional 
and intellectual elites, surely a similar ar-
gument could be made with respect to the 
American Revolution. Why did he take a 
radically different position with respect to 
these two events?
Burke believed he pursued a consistent 
line on these revolutions. The explanation 
he offered in his Appeal from the New to the 
Old Whigs is that he has «always firmly be-
lieved that they [the Americans] were pure-
ly on the defensive… standing… in the 
same relation to England as England did to 
King James the Second in 1688»41. In this 
essay, an attempt to persuade his fellow 
Whigs that they should not be sympathet-
ic to the ideals of the French Revolution, 
he maintains that the American colonists 
stood up against encroachments upon their 
established rights. In France, by contrast, it 
is «not the people, but the monarch [who] 
was wholly on the defensive… to preserve 
some fragments of the royal authority 
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“The Knight of the woeful countenance going to ex-
tirpate the National Assembly”: Burke come il Don 
Quixote della controrivoluzione, stampa ad opera 
di Frederick Byron, 1790
against a determined and desperate body 
of conspirators, whose object it was… to 
annihilate the whole of that authority»42. 
In other words, Burke was arguing that the 
American Revolution had been caused by 
the British Crown’s attempt to subvert the 
principles of the constitution, whereas the 
French Revolution was an attempt by the 
self-styled National Assembly to subvert 
the principles of the French Constitution. 
There is something to this claim, but it 
overlooks the important point that, if this 
is so clear, one might have expected that, 
while expressing sympathy for the Ameri-
can cause, Burke would have objected to the 
natural rights terminology deployed in the 
American Declaration of Independence.
This point signals a further reason for 
his contrasting positions on these two rev-
olutionary movements. It might well be the 
case that it was only by the time of the later 
revolution that Burke had come to realize 
the full significance of the American Revo-
lution, that it was not simply a revolution to 
preserve the common law rights of the free-
born Englishman. Only later did he realize 
that the American Revolution lit a beacon 
for the Enlightenment claim that legitimate 
government must be founded on the natu-
ral and inalienable rights of man. Only by 
1790 were these implications plain to see. 
Burke’s essay, it should be stressed, 
concerns ‘the revolution in France’ rather 
than ‘the French Revolution’. The revolu-
tionary zeal exhibited by the French was not 
confined to any particular nation-state: the 
missionary creed of the Rights of Man was 
explicitly designed for export. As Thom-
as Paine proclaimed, America had taken a 
stand not only for herself but on behalf of 
the modern world: the American Revolu-
tion was the moment and the place «where 
the principles of universal reformation 
could begin»43. The earlier revolution 
marks the beginning of the end of regimes 
of monarchical government based on mil-
itary objectives44, and replacement by gov-
ernment «founded on a moral theory, on a 
system of universal peace, on the indefea-
sible hereditary Rights of Man»45. Where-
as monarchical government is founded on 
hierarchy, the legitimating principle of the 
newly emerging regimes is that of equality. 
Government legitimated by divine will or 
sacred custom was now challenged by gov-
ernment authorized by the consent of free 
and equal citizens.
The three main principles underpin-
ning this ‘universal reformation’ are that 
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the individual possesses inherent natu-
ral rights, that the office of government is 
instituted to ensure the maintenance and 
full enjoyment of these rights, and that the 
best method of safeguarding these rights 
in the civil state is through the device of a 
written constitution specifying the funda-
mental terms of the bargain between rulers 
and ruled. «Man did not enter into society 
to become worse than he was before, nor to 
have fewer rights than he had before», ar-
gues Paine, «but to have those rights better 
secured»46. The modern regime of govern-
ment Paine proclaims is firmly founded on 
the ‘rights of man’. 
The explanation for Burke’s shrill as-
sessment of the situation in France in 1790 
is more clearly revealed by the full title to 
his essay: Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, and on the proceedings in certain soci-
eties in London relative to that event. Burke’s 
oratory is directed primarily to the Brit-
ish. In part it is addressed to the governing 
class, as a warning on the consequences of 
an utter failure of statecraft. But primarily 
it is aimed at the agitators at home. This is 
most clearly signalled at the end of Reflec-
tions. The improvements achieved by the 
French National Assembly, he claimed, 
«are superficial, their errors fundamen-
tal»47. Rather than taking models from 
them for the improvement of our own con-
stitution, we should be recommending to 
our neighbours the example of the British 
constitution. «Standing on the firm ground 
of the British constitution, let us be satis-
fied to admire, rather than attempt to fol-
low their desperate flights, the aeronauts of 
France»48. 
Burke later referred to the French Rev-
olution as the world’s first «total revolu-
tion». As he notes in his Letters on a Regicide 
Peace, «France, on her new system, means 
to form a universal empire, by producing 
a universal revolution»49. Consequently, 
Britain was not at war «with an ordinary 
community which is hostile or friendly as 
passion or as interest may veer about; not 
with a State that makes war through wanton-
ness, and abandons it through lassitude». 
Rather, we «are at war with a system, which 
by its essence is inimical to all other Gov-
ernments». We are, in short, at war «with 
an armed doctrine»50. He claims, further, 
that if a war to prevent Louis XIV from im-
posing his religion was just, similarly «a 
war to prevent the murderers of Louis XVI 
from imposing their irreligion upon us 
is just; a war to prevent the operation of a 
system… is a just war»51. His opposition 
to the French Revolution is an opposition 
to a fanatical sect spouting a revolutionary 
doctrine. Only in later life did he come to 
realize that, far from being simply a dis-
pute over the common law inheritance, the 
American Revolution could also be count-
ed as the first wave of a new type of political 
doctrine. 
5. Law
Government rests ultimately on the con-
sent of the people, and for Burke so too 
does law. The people are presumed to con-
sent to the laws laid down by the legisla-
ture, but they cannot be assumed to consent 
to laws that do not operate for the overall 
good. This much Burke makes clear in his 
views on Ireland. To contend otherwise is 
to connive in oppression. His argument is 
underpinned by natural law doctrine. The 
laws enacted by legislatures are, in the final 
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analysis, declaratory: they must ultimate-
ly be seen to be devised with the object of 
promoting human flourishing. The office of 
government exists to secure and conserve 
these human values. 
Burke’s convictions about the founda-
tion of lawful authority are most clearly re-
vealed in his speech on the impeachment 
of Warren Hastings over his conduct of 
government in India in his role as Gover-
nor-General of Bengal. Burke here argues 
that the natural rights of a people are uni-
versal and not subject to geography52. All 
law and all sovereignty is derived from God: 
«if the laws of every nation, from the most 
simple and social of the most barbarous 
people, up to the wisest and most salutary 
laws of the most refined and enlightened 
societies, from the Divine laws handed 
down to us in Holy Writ, down to the mean-
est forms of earthly institution, were at-
tentively examined, they would be found to 
breathe but one spirit, one principle, equal 
distributive justice between man and man, 
and the protection of one individual from 
the encroachments of the rest»53. It is only 
on the basis of this universal principle that 
sovereignty itself is established. 
The universal and natural foundation of 
law that he expounds in his arguments with 
respect to Irish and American affairs are in 
his speech on the Hastings impeachment 
explicitly tied to the authority of a divine 
creator. Burke here draws his speech to 
a close by pleading with the Lords to im-
peach Hastings «in the name and by vir-
tue of those eternal laws of justice which he 
has violated». «I impeach him», he states, 
«in the name of human nature itself, which 
he has cruelly outraged, injured, and op-
pressed, in both sexes, in every age, rank, 
situations, and condition of life»54.
Can these beliefs be reconciled with his 
views on the prescriptive authority of gov-
ernment and of the primary importance of 
prudence in politics? A strict natural rights 
doctrine would maintain that any claim to 
legal title must have some foundation in 
right and a possession acquired through 
force or fraud could never be valid. Yet 
Burke’s position is more ambiguous and 
nuanced. He maintains that «Time» must 
be permitted to «draw his oblivious veil 
over the unpleasant modes by which lord-
ships and demesnes have been acquired 
in theirs, and in almost all other countries 
upon earth»55. He accepts in effect that an 
original evil is transformed into good by 
virtue of a higher natural necessity – the 
need for order and the security of the state 
and its citizens. Burke considered it «pru-
dent to relativize at least part of what clas-
sical and Christian natural-law theory had 
held to be absolute and immutable»56. 
Prudence, we might recall, is «not only 
the first in rank of the virtues political and 
moral, but… the director, the regulator, 
and standard of them all»57. This sug-
gests that principle must remain subser-
vient to prudence. But Burke recognizes 
that «without the guide and light of sound, 
well-understood principles, all reasonings 
in politics, as in everything else, would be 
only a confused jumble of particular facts 
and details, without the means of drawing 
out any sort of theoretical or practical con-
clusion»58. There is, then, a crucial ambi-
guity in his thought on law and authority. 
Burke refuses to make a purely convention-
alist or historicist argument and inveighs 
principles in aid of his position, but he is, 
in the end, unable to offer anything other 
than a rhetorical account of the basis of his 
universal principles. 
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Conclusion
Burke distills his political jurisprudence 
from a variety of sources. Most fundamen-
tally, he regards society as an organic uni-
ty, maintaining that this sense of unity has 
through time shaped the distinctive char-
acter and situation of a people. He accepts 
the power of reason, but only when it works 
within this historical frame. And he rejects 
altogether the type of metaphysical rea-
son exhibited in natural rights doctrines. 
«Nothing universal», he suggests, «can 
be rationally affirmed on any moral, or any 
political subject». The lines of morality in 
the sphere of the political «admit of excep-
tions» and «demand modifications». For 
this reason, prudence is the highest vir-
tue in political jurisprudence59. Prudence 
– artifices officiorum – «requires a very 
solid and discriminating judgment, great 
modesty and caution, and much sobriety of 
mind in the handling». It can be reckoned 
only in the context of a particular situation, 
«else there is a danger that it may totally 
subvert those offices which it is its object 
only to methodize and reconcile»60.
If there is consistency in Burke’s meth-
od, there nonetheless remains a deep-seat-
ed tension in his political orientation be-
tween conservatism and liberalism. In one 
interpretation, he is the defender of the 
old order of nobility, of the ‘age of chival-
ry’, and of necessity of retaining ‘the decent 
drapery of life’ that bolsters the hierarchi-
cal ordering of society through the power 
of myth and superstition. Yet there is also 
considerable ambivalence in Burke’s view 
of the historical role of the bourgeoisie, and 
this reveals a liberalism that comes to the 
fore primarily in his writings on political 
economy. This is illustrated by his attack on 
the East India Company’s regime in India, 
where he defends the emerging liberal val-
ues of a disciplined, rational commercial-
ism against the vices of monopolistic abuse. 
These tensions in Burke’s writing re-
flect the tensions within modern liberal-
ism itself. Burke was conflicted because he 
could see that the movement of progressive 
societies was not simply a movement from 
status to contract. Contractual relations 
could work well only when commercial 
principles were set to work within a social 
order founded on status and hierarchy. The 
political pact invoked by liberal theorists 
on a principle of equality for the purpose of 
creating an image of unity also establishes 
a system of government founded on hier-
archy. Burke recognized that this pact is 
not created at some mythical constitutional 
moment: it is intergenerational. In doing 
so, he exposed a profound, if rather am-
bivalent, principle: political equality would 
become acceptable to liberals only once it 
is set to work within a status-derived social 
order.
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